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THE FIRST AUMF: THE NORTHWEST INDIAN WAR, 1790-
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Adam Mender
On September 29, 1789, while various state militias were involved
in hostilities with the Indian tribes and with very little attention, Con-
gress passed a bill to reorganize the federal military and allow Presi-
dent Washington to call upon state militias to protect the frontier
from Indian incursions.' While President Washington did not imme-
diately call upon these powers, on June 7, 1790, he allowed Secretary
of War Henry Knox to order General Josiah Harmar to begin a "puni-
tive expedition" against the Indians in response to a prior raid." To
support this mission, President Washington raised over 1500 militia
and the federal government entered its first war under the new Con-
stitution.
Throughout American history, scholars have been asking whether
the President has the power to begin a war without a formal declara-
tion from Congress, a debate that has begun again with renewed in-
terest since the outbreak of the War on Terror. This debate stems
from the text of the Constitution itself, which prescribes that the
President has the "executive Power"4 and is the "Commander in
Chief'5 of the armed forces, while Congress has the power to "declare
War" and "grant letters of Marque and Reprisal."" To argue that the
President does have the power to start war without a congressional
declaration, scholars have deployed a narrow reading of the Declare
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1 See Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 25, § 5, 1 Stat. 95, 96 (authorizing the President to use the
militia to fend off hostile Indians).
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5 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
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War Clause and used textual arguments to support the idea that a
formal declaration is not needed.! On the other hand, scholars favor-
ing greater congressional authority have countered with a broader
reading of the Declare War Clause and have supported their claims
with statements from the founding generation.! While this debate is
important, scholars neglect the possibility that the Constitution does
not require a single course of action for all possible scenarios, and
that the constitutional solution is often contextual.
While the United States Congress has declared war five times in its
history, the lack of a formal declaration has not prevented the United
States from becoming involved in numerous military conflicts across
the globe, and most recently in the War on Terror. In this Comment,
I argue that constitutional America's first war, the Northwest Indian
War, represents the United States' first use of a military authorization
as opposed to a declaration of war, and continues to serve as a model
for wars against non-state actors, most notably the War on Terror, to
this very day.
The Northwest Indian War is particularly relevant to the War on
Terror for two reasons. First, the United States has made direct com-
parisons between the War on Terror and the Indian wars of the past.
Indian tribes did not always fulfill Euro-American conceptions of
statehood and often used guerrilla warfare, tactics that some have
compared to those of terrorists today.9 The Bush Administration's
Office of Legal Counsel even went so far as to explicitly liken the In-
dian wars of the nineteenth century to the 9/11 attacks.0 The
Obama Administration has continued this practice, assigning the
codename "Geronimo," the name of the Apache resistance leader, to
Osama Bin Laden." With the United States already making compari-
sons between the Indian wars and the War on Terror, Indian history
should be considered to see whether these comparisons hold weight.
Second, the Northwest Indian War is particularly important due to
the rise of originalist constitutional interpretation, a strain of which
7 See, e.g., John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding
of War Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167, 172 (1996) [hereinafter The Continuation of Politics]
(explaining the divergent approaches of liberal and conservative ideology in construing
the powers of the President to initiate war).
8 See, e.g., William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power to Declare War,
82 CORNELL L. REv. 695, 698-99 (1997) (exploring the Founders' intentions in delegat-
ing war powers).
9 Matthew L.M. Fletcher & Peter S. Vicaire, Indian Wars: Old and New, 15J. GENDER RACE &
JUST. 201, 223 (2012).
10 Id. at 225-26.
11 Id. at 229.
1310 [Vol. 18:4
Apr. 2016] THE NORTHWEST INDIAN WAR AND THE WAR ON TERROR
holds that early precedents are particularly indicative of accepted
constitutional practice. This makes the Northwest Indian War, con-
stitutional America's first war, extremely relevant to understanding
the division of the war powers. Scholars favoring broad congressional
authority have often noted the active role Congress played in the
prosecution of the war, while those favoring broad executive power
tend to focus on the lack of an official declaration and the limited
tools used by Congress to manage the war.
In this Comment, I argue that the role of each branch has always
depended on the context of the war itself and that only by examining
the ways by which America has waged war can we understand how the
war powers actually function. While this contextual understanding of
the war powers may lead to a broader interpretation of such powers
with regards to non-state or sub-sovereign actors, the consequent de-
termination of sovereignty brings to light a troubling paradigm with
which originalist scholars have to grapple. The decision of who is a
sovereign has often been linked to Euro-American notions of sover-
eignty and civilization, and it is difficult to separate these notions
from the contextual understanding of the war powers, which allow
for greater executive discretion.
In Part I of this Comment, I describe the War on Terror and the
current debate surrounding theapplication of the war powers doc-
trine to the Authorization for the Use of Military Force ("AUMF"). In
Part II, I discuss the history of the Northwest Indian War and exam-
ine the United States' first authorization for the use of military force,
drawing on the concepts that allowed for the United States to enter a
war without a formal declaration. In Part III, I discuss the connec-
tions between the United States' current War on Terror and the
Northwest Indian War, and show how the Northwest Indian War Au-
thorization is a precursor to the War on Terror's AUMF. Finally, in
Part IV, I address the implications of understanding the Northwest
Indian War Authorization as a constitutional basis for the AUMF and
challenge originalist scholars to grapple with the Euro-American no-
tions of sovereignty which can allow for greater executive military dis-
cretion.
I. THE DEBATE OVER THE WAR POWERS AND THE AUMF
In Part I of this Comment, I will define the parameters of the War
on Terror and review the existing war powers literature as applied to
the Authorization for the Use of Military Force. Indeed, the need for
a more contextual understanding of the war powers is needed be-
cause of the current War on Terror-without such an understanding,
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it is difficult if not impossible to discern the constitutional parameters
of the current war. In Part I.A., I define, for the purpose of this pa-
per, the War on Terror and delineate which conflicts do and do not
fall within the definition of this war. In Part I.B., I discuss the war
powers as applied to the War on Terror.
A. Understanding the Parameters of the War on Terror
The War on Terror is the name of the extended military conflict
that followed the attacks of September 11, 2001. The War on Terror
is not a traditional war and has parameters that make the conflict po-
tentially limitless.12 As opposed to being at war with a specific state or
group of states, the United States' enemies in the War on Terror are
primarily citizens and residents of friendly nations or even the United
States." The battlefield, once a definable location, has no known lim-
itations, and can include any location, domestic or international, in
which terrorists are found.14 Furthermore, without a definite enemy
to be defeated, it is difficult to conceptualize when the enemy has
been defeated and the conflict is over.1 5 In the words of Professors
Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith, "Our war on terror begins with al
Qaeda, but it does not end there. It [does] not end until every ter-
rorist group of global reach, has been found, stopped, and defeat-
ed."16
Because of the potentially broad scope of the war itself, defining
the War on Terror in traditional terms can be difficult. Despite this
breadth, however, the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military
Force ("AUMF") is a common link between the many theaters of the
umbrella of the War on Terror." Therefore to understand the War
on Terror, one must consider the text of the AUMF, which states in
relevant part:
That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that oc-
curred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or per-
12 Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism,
118 HARV. L. Rv. 2047, 2048-49 (2005).
13 Id. at 2049.
14 Id.
I5 Id.
16 Id. (citation omitted).
17 Id. at 2055.
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sons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism
against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.
Therefore, any armed conflict engaged by the United States that has
been authorized by the AUMF can be considered part of the War on
Terror.9
To further understand the AUMF, Professors Bradley and Gold-
smith provide an analytical framework for understanding the breadth
of a military authorization, which I will later apply to the Northwest
Indian War. According to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, a mili-
tary authorization is defined by the: "(1) the authorized military re-
sources; (2) the authorized methods of force; (3) the authorized tar-
gets; (4) the purpose of the use of force; and (5) the timing and
procedural restrictions on the use of force."2  With regards to the
AUMF, they note that the authorization "to use all necessary and ap-
propriate force" covers both the resources and methods that the Pres-
ident can employ.21 Furthermore, the authorized target of that force
is all "nations, organizations, or persons [the President] determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that
occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or
persons," a statement that gives the President broad power to deter-
mine who is an enemy." In addition, the purpose of the use of force
is to "prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the
United States by such nations, organizations, or persons."2 3  Finally,
the only limitation provided by the AUMF is that the President com-
plies with the War Powers Resolution.
To this date, the conflicts initiated under the AUMF include the
war in Afghanistan and military operations in Pakistan, Yemen, and
18 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224
(2001).
19 Executive statements are essential to which conflicts coincide with authorizations, as the
courts generally refuse to review matters relating to the deployment of military in a con-
flict, finding it a non-justiciable political question. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 212-
13 (1962) (explaining the role of executive proclamations on the Court's ability to review
actions); see also Amanda L. Tyler, Is Suspension a Political Question?, 59 STAN. L. REv. 333,
404 n.374 (2006) (exploring judicial deference accorded to presidential decisions to
commit troops to a conflict).
20 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 2072.
21 Id. at 2078 (quoting Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, §
2(a), 115 Stat. 224).
22 Id. (quoting Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115
Stat. 224).
23 Id. (quoting Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115
Stat. 224).
24 Id. at 2078 n.130.
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Somalia.15 In addition, President Barack Obama has recently claimed
that the AUMF provides sufficient authorization for American strikes
against the Islamic State in Syria ("ISIS") in Iraq." Notably, however,
the initial War in Iraq, which began in 2002, is not part of the War on
Terror because it had its own subsequent authorization separate from
the AUMF.2 ' Therefore, it is only the aforementioned conflicts which
will be considered part of the War on Terror for the purpose of this
paper.
B. The Debate over the War Powers as Applied to the War on Terror
Locating the authority to initiate armed conflicts has been one of
the defining constitutional debates of the last century. The origin of
this debate stems from the division of powers established by the
Founding Fathers, who gave the President the "executive Power"2 8
and made him the "Commander in Chief'" of the armed forces,
while giving Congress the power to "declare War" and "grant letters
of Marque and Reprisal.,3 o
Arguments in favor of more broad executive authority have typi-
cally deployed textual reasoning to argue in support of a narrow
reading of the Declare War Clause.3 ' Arguing the contrary, scholars
favoring congressional authority have used originalist arguments,
centered on statements from the Founding Fathers showing a deep
fear of broad executive authority, to support a broader reading of the
Declare War Clause.
In recent years, this debate has continued in the context of the
War on Terror. Discussing the AUMF, Professors Bradley and Gold-
25 Jennifer C. Daskal & Stephen I. Vladeck, After the AUAF, 5 HARV. NAT'L SEC. L.J. 115, 121
(2014).
26 Spencer Ackerman, Obama's Legal Rationale for ISIS Strikes: Shoot First, Ask Congress Later,
THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 10, 2014,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/11/obama-isis-syria-air-strikes-legal-
argument
27 See generally Authorization for the Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002) (articulating the powers delegated to the Pres-
ident by Congress).
28 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
29 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
30 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
31 See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 2048 (noting that the meaning of the
AUMF is determined in the first instance by its text); Yoo, supra note 7, at 172.
32 See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM
AND ITS AFTERMATH 3-4 (1993) (highlighting that influential Framers believed a re-
quirement of congressional consent would reduce the incidences of war because execu-
tives tended to be more warlike than legislative bodies); Treanor, supra note 8, at 698-99.
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smith argue that the AUMF is equivalent to a declaration of war and
the executive has the power to act accordingly. In support of this
proposition, they note both historical practice and the development
of international law." With regards to historical practice, they note
that "[s] tarting with early conflicts against Indian tribes and the Qua-
si-War with France at the end of the 1700s, the United States has been
involved in hundreds of military conflicts that have not involved dec-
larations of war.", 4 Furthermore, they note that the formal use of
declarations of war was already falling out of practice prior to the rati-
fication of the Constitution, and therefore argue that they should not
be seen as a constitutional requirement." Of course, in response to
such an argument, there are those who would certainly argue that
"past violations are only that-violations;" the debate over the origi-
nal understanding of the war powers has yet to produce a satisfactory
36
answer.
The other argument Professors Bradley and Goldsmith use in
support of their position is the idea that the development of interna-
tional law had made formal declarations of war irrelevant. The Unit-
ed Nations now governs the rules of war but does not just apply these
rules to "war[s]" but also to "armed attack[s]" and the "use of force."3 1
Therefore, the rules of war, which were once triggered by a declara-
tion of war, are now applied without exception to all armed con-
flicts.36 As a result of this development, formal declarations of war no
longer serve a purpose in international law, and their use has de-
clined as a result." While these developments may be true, they do
not address the constitutional implications of such a change; many
originalists would argue that twentieth century changes in interna-
tional law should not affect our interpretation of an eighteenth cen-
tury document.40
Meanwhile, scholars such as Bruce Ackerman acknowledge that
the War on Terror does not fit into the traditional definitions of war
33 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 2057-66.
34 Id. at 2059-60.
35 Id. at 2058-59.
36 ELY, supra note 32, at 9.
37 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 2061 n.51 (citing INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS,
COMMENTARY: III GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF
WAR 19-20 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960)).
38 Id. at 2061.
39 Id. at 2061-62.
40 See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862-63 (1989)
("[T]he central practical defect of nonoriginalism is fundamental and irreparable: the
impossibility of achieving any consensus on what, precisely, is to replace original mean-
ing, once that is abandoned.").
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and that this has posed significant challenges for American constitu-
tionalism.4 As Professor Ackerman notes, "War is traditionally de-
fined as a state of belligerency between two sovereigns," and that
while certain conflicts within the War on Terror can be defined as
such, there are others which fall outside of this conceptual frame-
work.4 He further notes the differences between the War on Terror
and traditional war: the term "enemy" is relatively undefined and
broadly applicable, and there is no clear method by which the war
can end. Under this view of the War on Terror, the AUMF is there-
fore not seen as a formal declaration of war but rather the initiation
of a "state of emergency," giving the President the powers associated
with the latter but not the former."
While Professor Ackerman acknowledges that his approach is
more normative than descriptive, it is grounded in a constitutional
understanding of the war powers. Professor Ackerman notes that
"[t]he constitutional text grants the power to Congress to 'declare
war,' creating an opening for judges to tell the President and Con-
gress what a 'war' is and when the consent of Congress is required."45
Judicial abdication of this opening, however, has led to an unlimited
scope for war that significantly threatens constitutionally embedded
civil liberties." By arguing that the AUMF is not a substitute for a
declaration of war and indeed that the War on Terror is not itself a
war, Professor Ackerman proposes a constitutional view where the
powers of the executive are much narrower than their current use.
Critically, under this conception of the War on Terror, the power of
Congress is restored, because although the President has the power
to initiate new "battles" without congressional consent, he cannot ini-
tiate new wars. However, while Professor Ackerman proposes a rad-
ically different understanding of the war powers, it is nevertheless
limited for my purpose by its normative nature; it does not explain
how the war powers actually function.
41 See Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1032 (2004) [herein-
after The Emergency Constitution].
42 Id.
43 Id. at 1032-33.
44 Bruce Ackerman, This Is Not a War, 113 YALE L.J. 1871, 1873 (2004) [hereinafter This Is
Not a War]; see The Emergency Constitution, supra note 41, at 1030-31 (explaining that the
"paradigm case for emergency powers has been an imminent threat to the very existence
of the state").
45 This Is Not a War, supra note 44, at 1874.
46 Id. at 1874, 1876-77.
47 Id. at 1877.
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Highlighting this point is the fact that players within the Bush
Administration took a middle ground to their understanding of the
AUMF and the War on Terror. In his article Waging War Within the
Constitution, former Attorney General and Counsel to the President
Alberto Gonzales argues that while Congress did not formally declare
war by passing the AUMF, it nevertheless gave significant power to
the President, most notably the power to indefinitely detain enemy
combatants." Furthermore, Gonzales notes that the Bush Admin-
istration did not believe that the Geneva Conventions applied to the
War on Terror, and that it was not a state of war that existed between
the United States and the enemy but rather one of "armed conflict."4 9
Notably, Gonzales differentiates between the rules of the Geneva
Conventions, war, and domestic criminal law in a way similar to Pro-
fessor Ackerman's contention that the War on Terror should be seen
as something aside from war and criminal law.50 Also noteworthy is
the way Gonzales distinguishes between a military authorization and a
declaration of war, suggesting his disagreement with Professors Brad-
ley and Goldsmith's approach to viewing military authorizations and
declarations of war as having identical purposes."
Related to his view on the AUMF, Gonzales saw legal differences
between the ways in which wars could be waged against state and non-
state actors. Critical to his view that the Geneva Conventions did not
apply to al Qaeda, for example, was the idea that the United States
was at war with non-state actors and that therefore the Geneva Con-
ventions did not apply." With regards to the American military ef-
forts against the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Bush Administration
took the view that the Geneva Conventions applied only so long as it
remained sovereign and that the President "could suspend the Gene-
va Conventions upon his determination that the sovereign state of
48 Alberto R. Gonzales, Waging War Within the Constitution, 42 TEX. TECH L. REv. 843, 845-46
(2010).
49 Id.
50 Compare Gonzales, supra note 48, at 843, 845-46 (explaining that Congress did not for-
mally declare war and that the government strove to distinguish and keep separate the
systems of criminal law and armed conflict law), with The Emergency Constitution, supra note
41, at 1032-37 (finding that "neither of the standard legal rubrics"-the rubric of war and
the rubric of criminal law-"[wa]s really adequate").
51 Compare Gonzales, supra note 48, at 843, 845-46 (explaining that instead of formally de-
claring war, Congress passed a military authorization, thereby using the framework of
armed conflict to enable the government to detain enemy combatants), with Bradley &
Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 2061-62 (explaining that, historically, congressional authori-
zations and declarations go hand-in-hand, where Congress first declares war and then
takes "the additional step of authorizing the President to use force to prosecute the war").
52 Gonzales, supra note 48, at 850.
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Afghanistan ceased to exist."5 3 While President Bush ultimately de-
cided not to suspend the Geneva Conventions in Afghanistan, he re-
tained the belief that he had the power to do so if Afghanistan's sov-
ereignty was diminished. Furthermore, Gonzales acknowledges that
President Bush's "decision established a new legal paradigm for the
United States for dealing with non-state actors fighting an unconven-
tional war using tactics in violation of the laws of war," and notes that
the Obama Administration has embraced the Bush Administration's
view.55 In other words, Gonzales's position accurately characterizes
the current governmental understanding of the war powers as related
to the War on Terror, and the role that the United States' determina-
tions of enemy sovereignty factor into the application of the war pow-
ers.
The views of Bradley and Goldsmith, Ackerman, and Gonzales
thus illustrate the diversity of opinions with regards to the role of the
AUMF. Bradley and Goldsmith argue that the AUMF should be seen
as the equivalent to a formal declaration of war, bestowing on the
President all of the traditional wartime powers. Ackerman, on the
other hand, notes that the paradigm of war or criminal law fails to
capture the complexity of the War on Terror, and argues that the
AUMF should be seen as guiding the United States down that third
path. Gonzales, meanwhile, illustrates that the Bush Administration
did see the War on Terror as a third path, albeit one very different
than that proposed by Professor Ackerman. The Bush Administra-
tion's view on the AUMF was that it authorized a specific type of
armed conflict, defined by the limited applicability of the rules of war
to non-state or sub-sovereign actors. While Gonzales believes that the
Bush Administration articulated a new paradigm, I will argue in Part
II that the United States has always seen wars against non-state actors
as having different rules.
II. THE NORTHWEST INDIAN WAR AND THE FIRST AUMF
More than just a minor conflict, the Northwest Indian War was the
first war fought by the United States under the new Constitution. It
was a significant endeavor for the new republic, consuming "almost
53 Id. at 851.
54 Id. (citing Memorandum from George W. Bush, President of the United States, to the
Vice President, the Sec'y of State, the Sec'y of Def., the Attorney Gen., Chief of Staff to
the President, Dir. of Cent. Intelligence, Assistant to the President for Nat'1 Sec. Affairs,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Feb. 7, 2002), available at http://www.gwu.edu/-
nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.02.07.pdf).
55 Id. at 857.
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five-sixths of all federal expenditures" from 1790 to 1796,56 and in-
cluding the greatest military defeat the United States would ever suf-
fer at the hands of an Indian army. In Part II.A., I provide a basic
history of the Northwest Indian War, which will be considered
throughout the Part. In Part II.B., I examine the existing literature
applying the war powers debate from Part I to the Northwest Indian
War. Part II.C. argues that the constitutional war powers must be
considered in the context of existing international law and discusses
the application of the rules of war to the Indian tribes. Finally, in
Part II.D., I analyze the actions of Congress in the Northwest Indian
War under the framework of the AUMF.
A. Understanding the Northwest Indian War
The Northwest Indian War stemmed from the expansion of the
United States into the Northwest Territory, which included parts of
modern-day Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin." Un-
der the Articles of Confederation, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787
governed this expansion, representing the cession of the Northwest
Territory by the expansionist states to the federal government." Of
course, the land into which the United States sought to expand was
not empty, but rather was occupied by several Indian tribes, including
the Huron, Wyandot, Delaware, Shawnee, Ottawa, Chippewa, Pota-
watomi, Miami, Cherokee, and Wabash."
Despite the fact that this land was occupied by Indians at this time,
the Northwest Ordinance included only two mentions of Indians.6'
First, in Article III, the United States promised that "[t]he utmost
good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians; their lands
and property shall never be taken from them without their consent;
and in their property, rights, and liberty they never shall be invaded
or disturbed unless in just and lawful wars authorized by Congress.""
Despite this promise of "good faith," however, many scholars recog-
56 AAN TAYLOR, THE DIVIDED GROUND: INDIANS, SETTLERS, AND THE NORTHERN
BORDERLAND OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 238 (2006).
57 FRED ANDERSON & ANDREW CAYTON, THE DOMINION OF WAR 192-93 (2005).
58 WILEY SWORD, PRESIDENT WASHINGTON'S INDIAN WAR: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE OLD
NORTHWEST, 1790-1795, at xiii (1985).
59 ANDERSON & CAYTON, supra note 57, at 189-90.
60 SWORD, supra note 58, at 41.
61 See generaly NORTHWEST ORDINANCE (1787) (decreeing that "utmost good faith" should
be shown to Indians and, in contrast, discussing the procedure that should be followed
after Indian title to land has been extinguished).
62 NORTHWEST ORDINANCE art. IIL.
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nize this policy as an "enormous charade." While good faith may
have been promised, that promise paled in comparison with the
Northwest Ordinance's " [commitment of] the United States to [the]
possession and development of the very lands in question." Good
faith was supposed to commit the United States to the purchase poli-
cy, but in reality the United States "would tell the Indians which tract
was to be 'sold' and what would be paid for it.""6 5 The goal of the pol-
icy articulated in the Northwest Ordinance was that "ultimately [the
Indians] would be required to dispose of all needed lands.",6 In more
recent years, the Supreme Court has even acknowledged the extent
of the "good faith" charade.
Second, the Northwest Ordinance is premised on the idea that
Indians were to be excluded from the lands governed by the United
States. In Section 8, the Northwest Ordinance gives to the governor
of the territory power over all land "in which the Indian titles shall
have been extinguished."" The plan outlined in the Northwest Or-
dinance allowed for the development of representative governments
once a certain population level was reached, and this population was
not envisioned to include Indians." Taken together, these two sec-
tions outline the American plan to expand the United States through
the territorial dispossession of the Indians.
Many Indian tribes, however, did not agree with this policy and
contested American expansion. Previously hostilities between Indi-
ans and settlers were state issues, but the Northwest Ordinance put
the tribes in direct conflict with the federal government." With the
federal government now spurring expansion, many Indians recog-
nized that this was a critical moment in the struggle to maintain con-
63 SWORD, supra note 58, at 50 (explaining that the matter was an "enormous charade" be-
cause "[a]ny prospect of fairly dealing with the Indians by 'purchasing' their lands paled
under the overt declaration in the 1787 Northwest Ordinance, which committed the
United States to possession and development of the very lands in question"); see also An-
derson & Cayton, supra note 57, at 190 (noting that "Congress's immediate goal was to
impose order on the Indian Country," and the Northwest Ordinance provided a "robust
institutional framework for the American colonization").
64 SWORD, supra note 58, at 50; KOHN, supra note 2, at 92.
65 SWORD, supra note 58, at 50.
66 Id.
67 See Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 289-90 (1955) ("Every American
schoolboy knows that the savage tribes of this continent were deprived of their ancestral
ranges by force and that, even when the Indians ceded millions of acres by treaty ... it
was not a sale but the conquerors' will that deprived them of their land.").
68 Northwest Ordinance § 8 (1787).
69 ANDERSON & CAYrON, supra note 57, at 190.
70 KOHN, supra note 2, at 67; SWORD, supra note 58, at 55-56.
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trol of their lands east of the Mississippi River, and as a result, a state
of undeclared war broke out in the region."
Then, on June 21, 1788, the United States adopted another criti-
cal document: the United States Constitution.72 With the establish-
ment of the new government, Congress had to decide what to do with
the Northwest Ordinance and, in August of 1789, it readopted the
ordinance with little alteration. Indeed, the passage of the bill was
such a foregone conclusion that there was minimal discussion of it on
either the Senate or the House floors. Furthermore, a month after
Congress reauthorized the Northwest Ordinance, they also passed a
bill to reorganize the federal military and allow President Washington
to call upon state militias to protect the frontier from Indian incur-
sions. With these two acts in place, Congress had reestablished the
expansion policy that would necessitate the Northwest Indian War
and authorized the force that would be used to prosecute it.
For a time, the undeclared hostilities between the settlers and the
Indians would continue, but on June 7, 1790, President Washington
allowed Secretary of War Henry Knox to order General Josiah
Harmar to begin a "punitive expedition" against the Indians, a feder-
al response to the raids of approximately 200 "renegade" Indian war-
riors. To support this mission, President Washington raised over
1500 militia, which began assembling at Forts Washington and
Steuben by mid-September.77  To this build-up, the Indians respond-
ed by assembling their own force of over 1000 warriors.7 s The Ameri-
can troops were poorly prepared and trained, and as one observer
71 SWORD, supra note 58, at 55, 72.
72 See generally U.S. CONST. (founding a new rule of law for the young nation).
73 ANDERSON & CAYTON, supra note 57, at 190.
74 See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 642, 659-60, 666 (1789) (Joseph Gale ed:, 1834) (passing the
Northwest Ordinance in the House on July 21, after two readings on July 16 andJuly 17);
see also 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 51-52, 56-57 (1789) (Joseph Gale ed., 1834) (passing the
Northwest Ordinance in the Senate on August 5 after three readings).
75 wILLIAM H. GUTHMAN, MARCH TO MASSACRE: A HISTORY OF THE FIRST SEVEN YEARS OF
THE UNITED STATES ARMY, 1784-1791, at 173 (1975) (explaining that "the President was
given authority by Congress to call upon the the state militia to supplement the small
Federal force without asking permission of Congress"); KOHN, supra note 2, at 102 (de-
scribing how the 1789 instructions were used when Pennsyvlania and Kentucky militia
were called on).
76 KOHN, supra note 2, at 102.
77 SWORD, supra note 58, at 92; see also KOHN, supra note 2, at 102-03 (illustrating how Gen-
eral St. Clair convinced President Washington of the need for additional troops).
78 KOHN, supra note 2, at 102.
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noted, "Their whole object seemed nothing more than to see the
country without rendering any service whatever.""
Nevertheless, on September 26, 1790, under the command of
General Harmar, the American army began its advance upon the In-
dian tribes." The expedition was supposed to take the Indians by
surprise, but by October 10, 1790, the army became aware of the fact
they were under Indian surveillance."' The Americans were never
able to catch the Indians, only managing to burn abandoned villages
while suffering significant casualties to Indian ambushes during
smaller expeditions.2 When the expedition ended in November, a
disheartened President Washington would replace General Harmar
with General Arthur St. Clair." This move, however, proved unsuc-
cessful, as the territorial governor would lead an even more disastrous
campaign the following year, in which two-thirds of the federal force
would be destroyed.84 St. Clair's campaign remains the most devastat-
ing loss the United States would ever suffer against the Indians."
Yet in a December address to Congress, President Washington
would address the military expedition, claiming authority for his ac-
tions under a 1789 act, and the formal status of the war was cement-
ed." The Northwest Indian War would continue for a few more
years, with several failed attempts to establish a treaty and lasting
peace with the Indians." It would take the defeat of the Native tribes
by General Anthony Wayne at the Battle of Fallen Timbers in 1794
and the 1795 Treaty of Greenville for the war to finally subside."
B. The Application of the War Powers Debate to the Northwest Indian War
The Northwest Indian War was the United States' first war, and
therefore, from an originalist perspective, it deserves much consider-
79 SWORD, supra note 58, at 92 (citing American State Papers: Military Affairs, 1:24; 2 W 335,
Draper Manuscripts).
80 SWORD, supra note 58, at 95.
81 Id. at 97.
82 Id. at 98-116.
83 Id. at 121.
84 Id. at 190, 195 (noting that in the terminal battle of General St. Clair's expedition "[a]
staggering 55% of the American combatants had become casualties within only a few
hours," and that, by one count, "[t]he dead and missing numbered 630").
85 ANDERSON & CAYTON, supra note 57, at 192-93.
86 KoHN, supra note 2, at 107.
87 See, e.g., 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 816 (1793) (describing the cost of war, in dollars and the
lives of American soldiers); 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 135-36 (1793) (discussing a treaty that
would provide the Native American tribes with a lump sum of $50,000 and an annual
payment of $10,000 thereafter in exchange for peace).
88 KOHN, supra note 2, at 181-82.
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ation. While there are many variations of originalism, in general "it
refers to the practice of explicitly returning to Founding-era under-
standings and intentions to reach conclusions about what the Consti-
tution means today."" Many scholars value originalism for its majori-
tarian underpinnings and promises of judicial restraint." Due to its
focus on "Founding-era understanding" originalism "requires im-
mersing oneself in the political and intellectual atmosphere of the
time . .. a task sometimes better suited to the historian than the law-
yer."9' Originalism therefore requires that one delve into the history
to understand the meaning of the Constitution. While not all
originalists accept this premise, post-ratification history is essential to
this historical endeavor and "[t]he Supreme Court has interpreted
evidence that the first Congress either took, approved, or acquiesced
in some action as a virtually irrefutable indication of the constitution-
al validity of that action."" The Northwest Indian War, prosecuted by
the United States' earliest Congresses and its first President, is there-
fore critical to understanding the original meaning of the war pow-
ers.
Furthermore, while most scholars have not fully considered the
constitutional implications of the Northwest Indian War, some have
analyzed its constitutional significance. For example, Professor John
C. Yoo" argues that the conduct of President Washington and Con-
gress during the Northwest Indian War supports his conception of
the war powers. Professor Yoo notes that President Washington had
broad discretion in deciding how to prosecute the war, and only ap-
89 Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 9-10
(1998).
90 Id.; see, e.g., John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitu-
tion, 98 GEO. L.J. 1693, 1700 (2010) ("[A] good constitution is the product of a consensus
of the nation."); Scalia, supra note 40, at 864 ("Originalism.. establishes a historical crite-
rion that is conceptually quite separate from the preferences of the judge himself."),
91 Scalia, supra note 40, at 856-57.
92 Rebecca L. Brown, Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE L.J. 177, 184-85 (1993); see also Fried-
man & Smith, supra note 89, at 50 ("[1It should come as little surprise that originalist
judges themselves regularly interpret the Constitution by relying . . . on . . . post-
ratification practices.").
93 Professor Yoo, currently a faculty member at the University of California-Berkeley Law
School, was previously a member of President George W. Bush's Office of Legal Counsel
from 2001 to 2003. John Choon Yoo, BERKELEY LAw FAcULTY PROFILES (Feb. 19, 2015 1:58
PM), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/php-
programs/faculty/facultyProfile.php?faclD=235.
94 SeeJohn C. Yoo, George Washington and the Executive Power, 5 U. ST. THOMAS J. L. & PUB.
POL'Y 1, 18 (2010) [hereinafter George Washington and the Executive Power] (describing
President Washington's statement where he decided not to attack the Creek Indians until
Congress deliberated and authorized war).
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pealed to Congress when he needed "increases in the size of the ar-
my, military spending, or the approval of agreements-in other
words, those areas where the Constitution specifically provided for a
legislative role." While he acknowledges that Congress did play a
significant role in the prosecution of the war, he suggests that this was
not because of the Declare War Clause but rather because there were
insufficient troops for the President to command. According to
Professor Yoo, the Northwest Indian War shows that the primary
check of Congress in the prosecution of a war is its power of the
purse, and not its power under the Declare War Clause.7
In contrast to Professor Yoo, Abraham Sofaer argues that the
Northwest Indian War suggests a more tempered pro-executive mod-
el.99 According to Professor Sofaer, "The scheme devised by the
Framers of the Constitution enables the President in certain situa-
tions to use force without prior legislative approval, but subject to
Congress's ultimate control."99 Critically, Professor Sofaer believes
that the lack of specificity with regard to the authorizing statute gave
President Washington broad discretion with regard to the federal use
of the militia against Indian incursions.oo At the same time, however,
Professor Sofaer acknowledges Congress's constant monitoring of the
size of the military establishment and suggests that this incessant
monitoring suggests congressional approval of executive actions.'o
Therefore, Professor Sofaer argues, it is congressional approval and
not the specific authorization that is critical to the presidential use of
the war powers.o2 Professor Sofaer thus articulates a constitutional
model of the war powers in which the President has extensive discre-
tion as Commander-in-Chief so long as the actions being taken are in
line with the will of Congress. This is a more narrow conception of
the executive authority than suggested by Professor Yoo, who believes
95 Id.
96 Id. at 19. Professor Yoo notes, "After assuming office, Washington reported to Congress
that the existing army numbered only 672 officers and soldiers, scattered across the fron-
tier." Professor Yoo explains that "[bly comparison, Indian tribes menacing Georgia
could field 5000 warriors for battle." Id.
97 See id. at 19 (detailing the practical difficulties of declaring war if Congress refuses to au-
thorize funding); The Continuation of Politics, supra note 7, at 285 (showing how early con-
cerns that the President could abuse his war powers were alleviated by Congress's powers
to defund the military).
98 See Abraham D. Sofaer, The Power over War, 50 U. MIAMI L. REv. 33, 34 (1995) (asserting
that the President is "not so powerless").
99 Id. at 34-35.
100 Id. at 41.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 51.
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that executive power is nearly unlimited so long as it is not specifically
checked. The difference is one of timing, in that Professor Sofaer ar-
gues that after military action has been authorized, the executive has
broad discretion in prosecuting the war so long as Congress does not
impose any limitations, while Professor Yoo states a conception of the
war powers where the executive has the power to take military action
prior to authorization so long as Congress has not taken any limiting
action.
While Professors Sofaer and Yoo argue for differing conceptions
of the war powers, these scholars rightfully recognize the importance
of the Northwest Indian War in understanding the constitutional war
powers. Although this recognition is important, they still fail to ad-
dress the context of the war itself. In addition to considering the al-
location of war powers in the Northwest Indian War, the very nature
of the war as an Indian war needs to be considered. It is my conten-
tion that the Northwest Indian War is not necessarily a model for war
against all actors but rather only against non-state actors. In the re-
maining sections of Part II, I shall examine the specific rules regard-
ing Indian wars that shaped the prosecution of the Northwest Indian
War.
C. The International Rules of War at the Time of Ratification
The international rules of war significantly influenced the Fram-
ers' determination of how wars should be waged with regards to dif-
ferent types of actors. Although not written into the Constitution,
the rules of war provide a framework for understanding how the
Framers anticipated the Constitution would function. The Framers
distributed the war powers amongst the branches of government in a
specific context, and understanding that context is critical to under-
standing this distribution. Recognizing this backdrop, scholars regu-
larly rely on the international rules of law to provide context to their
interpretations of the constitutional war powers, in accordance with
its original meaning.1 0 3 While the Constitution does not have to be
read as consistent with current international law,104 understanding
eighteenth century international law and the rules of war is critical to
103 Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALEJ. INT'L L. 1, 19 (2006).
104 Compare Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 44 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), did not apply an international law limiting the President's
authority under the AUMF), oith Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 5-75 (2005) (conclud-
ing that international law is relevant to the assessment of evolving standards of decency
under the Eighth Amendment).
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determining the original understanding of the war powers. Indeed,
in the words of Justice Antonin Scalia, originalism "requires immers-
ing oneself in the political and intellectual atmosphere of the time."'5
Furthermore, one early war powers case, Brown v. United States,
holds that eighteenth century international law should be read into
the war powers.o' Discussing whether the President had the power to
confiscate enemy property during wartime, Chief Justice Marshall
turned to the Declare War Clause and wrote, "In expounding [the]
constitution, a construction ought not lightly to be admitted which
would give to a declaration of war an effect in this country it does not
possess elsewhere.""' By making such a statement, ChiefJustice John
Marshall explicitly endorses the idea that the Declare War Clause
should take shape within the contours of international law.'08 Justice
Joseph Story, writing in dissent, agreed with the Chief Justice with re-
gards to the critical context of international law in understanding the
constitutional war powers; it was only his interpretation of interna-
tional law that led to his dissent.' Considering the precedential val-
ue of Chief Justice Marshall's opinion and the nature of the
originalist project, proponents of originalism must consider the in-
ternational rules of war in order to fully understand the war powers.
One influential international theorist whose work strongly influ-
enced the Framers of the Constitution, including those who would
become part of the Washington Administration, was Emmerich de
Vattel."o Prior to Vattel, most Euro-American thinkers believed in the
Christian idea of just and unjust war. This theory, in the words of the
sixteenth century theologian Francisco de Vitoria, could be summed
up as the idea that "[a] prince may do everything in a just war which
is necessary to secure peace and security from attack."' Under just
war theory, hostilities were just so long as the cause was just and un-
just when the cause was unjust.'12 As a result, just war theory failed to
establish rules of conduct and often led to increasing levels of hostili-
ties, as each side believing their cause just, responded to the actions
of the other with increased violence.'13
105 Scalia, supra note 40, at 856-.
106 Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814).
107 Id. at 125.
108 Cleveland, supra note 103, at 20.
109 Id.
110 Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, 124 YALE L.J. 1012, 1061 (2015).
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Vattel, recognizing this problem, proposed the revolutionary idea
that "[r] egular war is to be accounted just on both sides.""'4  This
principle dramatically changed the fundamental nature of the rules
of war, as it allowed for nations to set aside the righteousness of their
causes and focus on the conduct of war."' As a result of Vattel's rule
of regular war, extreme hostilities would no longer be permissible
simply because the nation's leaders believed in the just nature of
their cause."" Within this framework, rules for limiting war could
117
emerge.
The rules of war, however, did not apply to everyone, and there
was much debate about to whom the rules applied. As one commen-
tator noted, Vattel's rules were a way by which "the civilized powers of
Europe" could reduce "the horrors of war," but there were questions
as to how those rules were to be applied outside traditional European
wars. Within the American context, the Washington Administra-
tion acknowledged the independence of the Indian tribes but also
considered them to be lesser sovereigns existing within the borders of
the United States as set by the Treaty of Paris."9 As President Wash-
ington's Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson used Vattel's theories to
argue that European dealings with the Indians would be considered
an impingement on American sovereignty.20 As Professor Gregory
Ablavsky writes, "this inclusion [of Indian nations within the territori-
al limits of the United States] meant that the United States now pos-
sessed 'territorial title'-what we would now call territorial sovereign-
ty-over Indian country."0' Furthermore, Professor Ablavsky notes
that that "this shared sovereignty suggested that Natives did not pos-
sess sovereignty equivalent to that of the United States or Spain or
Britain." '2 Instead, "[t]erritoriality established Native sovereignty as
subordinate to the sovereignty of the United States."'2 3 Under this
framework, the subordinate sovereignty of the Indian tribes permit-
114 Id.
115 Id. at 18.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 19.
119 Ablavsky, supra note 110, at 1063.
120 Id. at 1065-66.
121 Id. at 1063.
122 Id. at 1064.
123 Id.; see also THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON DIGITAL EDITION, 398 (Theodore J.
Crackel ed., Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press 2008) (showing that President
Washington wrote about "the disputes which exist between some of the United States and
several powerful Tribes of Indians within the limits of the Union") (emphasis added).
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ted American deviation from the rules of war that applied to Europe-
an state actors.
Furthermore, the Americans did not see much advantage in au-
tomatically applying international law and the rules of war to their
conflicts with the Indians. One reason for declining to extend
Vattel's rules to the Indians was that the Indians did not follow
Vattel's rules. Therefore, the Americans saw themselves as free from
that restraint. Americans considered the Indians to be savage na-
tions, and as Vattel noted, "When.. .at war with a savage nation who
observe no rules.. .we may punish them in the persons of any of their
people."125 Critically, Vattel believed such enemies to be "savage
beasts, whom every brave man may jusdy exterminate from the face of
the earth.""'
The conception of the Indian tribes as savage nations to whom the
rules of war did not apply predates the Constitution and is embedded
in the United States' founding texts. In the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, the colonists went so far as to note amongst their griev-
ance against King George III that "[h]e has excited domestic insur-
rections amongst us, and has endeavoured [sic] to bring on the
inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages, whose
known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages,
sexes, and conditions.""' ThomasJefferson argued that "[t]he known
rule of warfare with the Indian savages is an indiscriminate butchery
of men[,] women[,] and children.""' Such a statement was rather
tame by Jeffersonian standards, as the future president would also
proclaim that " [t] he same world will scarcely do for them and us" and
that the remedy to this situation was "their extermination."9
The Jeffersonian conception of Indians as savages carried over in-
to the First Congress. Throughout its sessions, both President Wash-
ington and the members of Congress would refer to the Indians as
savages on the congressional floor."o Such statements allowed for the
Americans to argue that international law and the theory of regular
124 WrIr, supra note 111, at 16-17.
125 Id. at 92.
126 Id. at 32.
127 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
128 Wirr, supra note 111, at 32.
129 Id.
130 See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 702 (1789) (Joseph Gale ed., 1834) (questioning whether
making treaties with the Indians is "nothing more than holding out a bribe for the savag-
es to commence hostilities whenever they want presents from the United States"); 1
ANNALS OF CONG. 893 (1789) (Joseph Gale ed., 1834) (describing the warring Indians in
the west as "savages" in President Washington's words).
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war could not apply to the Indian tribes. In other words, "the Wash-
ington Administration acknowledged considerable Native autonomy
but did not recognize Native nations as the United States' equals in
the community of nations."3 ' This conception of the Indians allowed
for the rules of war to apply quite differently to the Indian tribes than
it would to European nations.
D. An Examination of the Role of Congress in the Prosecution of the
Northwest Indian War
President Washington claimed that his military actions were au-
thorized by Congress as part of their enactment of a bill that gave the
President the power to raise militias for defensive maneuvers against
the Indians. The congressional response to the President's declara-
tion can therefore be seen as the first test of the American war pow-
ers. Were Congress to rebuke the President and claim that the mili-
tary operations had not been authorized or explicitly declare war
against the Indian tribes in the Northwest Territory, that would
strongly suggest a broader reading of the Declare War Clause. On
the other hand, were Congress to permit the President to prosecute
the war as he chooses, that would suggest a broader interpretation of
executive powers. Under an orginalist framework, the ways by which
Congress responded to this first invocation of the war powers is illus-
trative of the way the Founders likely intended the war powers to
work.
To begin, however, one must first understand that the authoriza-
tion of military force was requested by President Washington, who be-
lieved the establishment of a national military was critical to the suc-
cess of the new nation. Under the Articles of Confederation,
President Washington's party, the Federalists, had sought the estab-
lishment of a national army, but had been unable to achieve this
goal. In particular, the Federalists believed that a national army was
critical to the protection of the frontier, but were only permitted to
post a few garrisons of federal troops in the west "to be maintained in
time of peace at the expence [sic] of the United States for their secu-
rity and defense." On August 7, 1789, little over a month before the
passage of the bill, President Washington renewed his push for the
establishment of a national army, again to protect the western fron-
131 Ablavsky, supra note 110, at 1067.
132 KOHN, supra note 2, at 40-44.
133 Id. at 52.
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tier.' In a letter to Congress, President Washington wrote that "the
disputes which exist between some of the United States and several
powerful Tribes of Indians within the limits of the Union.. .seem to
require the immediate interposition of the general Government."3 5
In response to these hostilities, President Washington sought the es-
tablishment of a commission to establish a treaty with the Indians,
and should that fail, the establishment of "some uniform and effec-
tive system for the Militia of the United States."
President Washington not only believed that the establishment of
a national army may be necessary for this conflict, but also supported
the immediate creation of such a force because he feared that the
military knowledge that was now "disseminated throughout the sever-
al States," was "daily diminishing by death and other causes."'" Presi-
dent Washington argued, "To suffer this peculiar advantage to pass
away unimproved, would be to neglect an opportunity which will nev-
er again occur, unless, unfortunately, we should again be involved in
a long and arduous war."'" As this letter illustrates, President Wash-
ington was not only concerned with the state of the hostilities on the
frontier, but also feared that American military knowledge was being
lost. By calling for the immediate establishment of a national force,
President Washington was not only able to prepare for the possible
use of military force, but also was able to preserve the young Ameri-
can military tradition.
Critically, however, President Washington wished to ensure that
any military action was done in conformity with the Constitution. He
believed that he had the power to direct the forces already under his
control via an act passed by Congress under the Articles of Confeder-
ation, but sought that these actions "be conformed, by law, to the
Constitution of the United States."' President Washington seemed
to believe that he had the ability to use the troops that had been as-
signed to him under the Articles of Confederation, but because of
the establishment of the new government, sought reauthorization to
ensure constitutional conformity.
In response to President Washington's request, the House of Rep-
resentatives and Senate each established a committee to consider the
134 See, generally THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON DIGITAL EDITION, supra note 123, at
398-99 (describing President Washington's letters to Congress, in which he urged that
Congress prioritize a "uniform and effective system for the" national army).




139 Id. at 413.
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use of military force against the Indians.'" The House Committee
came to conclude "that an act ought to pass providing a proper sys-
tem of regulations for the militia of the United States,"4' and on Sep-
tember 29, 1789, that act came to fruition as Congress passed the
United States' first authorization for the use of military force.'4 2 The
bill states:
That for the purpose of protecting the inhabitants of the frontiers of the
United States from the hostile incursions of the Indians, the President is
hereby authorized to call into service from time to time, such part of the
militia of the states respectively, as he may judge necessary for the pur-
pose aforesaid; and that their pay and subsistence while in service, be the
same as the pay and subsistence of the troops above mentioned.4 3
This text represents what I believe to be America's first "AUMF," and
I plan to analyze this bill under the framework introduced earlier to
analyze the AUMF for the War on Terror, which included: "(1) the
authorized military resources; (2) the authorized methods of force;
(3) the authorized targets; (4) the purpose of the use of force; and
(5) the timing and procedural restrictions on the use of force."'"
First, when considering the authorized military resources, the bill
allows the President to use the "militia of the states." This provision is
rather straightforward in that it specifies which military units the
President may use, namely "the militia of the states."
Second, the bill specifies that the use of the militia is the author-
ized method of force. While the militia was a specific part of the mili-
tary establishment, it had certain capacities, and can be seen as a
method of force. Militias had a certain military capacity, and that ca-
pacity was to be used at the discretion of President Washington.
Third, the bill authorizes the use of force against Indians. Nota-
bly, Congress did not specify against which tribes force could be used,
allowing for considerable executive discretion in determining the
targets. Given the knowledge the Americans had of the tribes, Con-
gress could have distinguished between those that were hostile and
those that were not.'" While there were shifting alliances and fac-
tions within tribes which differed in their stance towards the United
States, Congress could have been more specific in its authorization.
140 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 64 (1789) (Joseph Gale ed., 1834); id. at 685.
141 Id. at 688.
142 Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 25, § 5, 1 Stat. 95.
143 Id.
144 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 2072.
145 Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 25, § 5, 1 Stat. 95.
146 See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 82. (1789) (Joseph Gale ed., 1834) (listing which tribes had
treaties and which tribes did not).
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In not specifying against which tribes force could be used, Congress
left such necessary determinations to the President.
Fourth, the purpose of the authorized force is to "[protect] the
inhabitants of the frontiers of the United States from the hostile in-
cursions of the Indians."1 4 ' The authorization seems to permit Presi-
dent Washington to use force to defend the frontier. However, most
current constitutional scholars believe that the President, as part of
his Commander-in-Chief power, can defend the United States from
invasion without congressional authorization.148 Therefore the prop-
er reading of this provision may be that the line between defensive
and offensive measures is blurred, and that the authorization allows
for any military action necessary to "protect the inhabitants of the
frontier."'4 9  In that way, this bill can be seen as a broad grant of au-
thority to the President.
Fifth, with regards to limitations, Congress stated that this bill was
to only "be in force until the end of the next session of Congress, and
no longer."5 0 This explicit limitation is critical in that it only allowed
the President to call upon the militia so long as the bill was in effect.
By providing a sunset provision to the bill, Congress ensured for itself
the opportunity to remain engaged in the prosecution of the war.
Notably, before President Washington declared his intent to use mili-
tary operations, however, the bill was repealed and reauthorized, with
the extra provision of raising 1216 federal troops.1 5' The only change
made to the militia provision was the requirement that the militia
conform to the "rules and articles of war."'5  Congress wished to con-
tinue to provide President Washington with the discretion to make
decisions with regards to war as necessary.
147 Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 25, § 5, 1 Stat. 95.
148 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 1, cl. 2 (delineating Congress's composition and vesting it with
"[a]ll legislative Powers"); see also Michael Bahar, The Presidential Intervention Principle: The
Domestic Use of the Military and the Power of the Several States, 5 HARv. NAT'L SEC.J. 537, 543,
n.20 (2014) (noting that "it is fairly well-settled that in times of invasions, or threat there-
of, presidential authority to defend the homeland is at its height, regardless of legislative
sanction"); Yoo, supra note 7, at 246-48 (differentiating between a declaration of war
power and an authorization of war).
149 Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 25, § 5, 1 Stat. 95.
150 Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 25, § 6, 1 Stat. 95.
151 See generally An Act for Regulating the Military Establishment of the United States, Apr.
30. 1790, Ch. 10, 1 Stat. 119. Throughout the rest of this paper, I will refer to both this
act and the Act of Sept. 29, 1790, as the Authorization for the Northwest Indian War.
While these are two different acts, the language regarding the use of force against the In-
dians in the Northwest Territory is largely the same. When referring to the specific act, I
will use the full name of the act; however, when I am speaking of the general authoriza-
tion, that is the language I will use.
152 Id.
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Finally, it is worth noting that this authorization came in the form
of an appropriations bill. As Professor Yoo has stated, one of the ways
by which Congress can check the presidential use of force is through
appropriations.'" While today military appropriations are a regular
part of the budget and the United States has a peacetime army, there
was no significant standing army in the United States during the
1790s.'54 Congress was tasked with paying for the federal force, and
made sure to only pay as much as they felt was appropriate by setting
soldiers' salaries, even going so far as to charge the soldiers for their
uniforms.5" Despite these cost concerns, or perhaps because of
them, five-sixths of all federal expenditures from 1790 to 1796 were
used on the war effort.5 6
Immediately after Congress passed the military authorization,
President Washington began to establish a military force, but did not
immediately take military action.57 It was not until over a year after
the initial authorization, on December 8, 1790, that President Wash-
ington delivered a speech to Congress informing them of his decision
to use offensive measures against the Indians. President Washington
noted that the Indians' "aggravated provocations rendered it essential
to the safety of the Western settlements, that the aggressors hould be
made sensible that the Government of the Union is not less capable
of punishing their crimes, than it is disposed to respect their rights
and reward their attachments."'" Furthermore, President Washing-
ton stated, "As this object could not be effected by defensive
measures, it became necessary to put in force the act which empowers
the President o call out the militia for the protection of the fron-
tiers."'59 By making this proclamation, President Washington claims
that these military actions are in accordance with the congressional
authorization. In addition, President Washington's statement sup-
ports the proposition that the permission to " [protect] the frontier"
allowed for both offensive and defensive measures.
Worth noting, however, is that the President did not just state his
intention to use the militia; he also planned to combine that force
with the federal regulars positioned in the area. In President Wash-
153 The Continuation ofPolitics, supra note 7, at 213-14 (describing the British Parliament's use
of appropriations to control the Crown).
154 KOHN, supra note 2, at 52.
155 An Act for Regulating the Military Establishment of the United States, Apr. 30. 1790, Ch.
10, § 5, 1 Stat. 119.
156 TAYLOR, supra note 56, at 238.
157 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON DIGITAL EDITION, supra note 123, at 116.
158 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1729 (1790) (Joseph Gale ed., 1834).
159 Id.
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ington's own words, he "authorized an expedition, in which the regu-
lar troops in that quarter area [are] combined with such draughts of
militia as were deemed sufficient." " Under the Act for Regulating
the Military Establishment of the United States, however, the Presi-
dent was not explicitly authorized to use regular troops for such pro-
visions.'6 1 President Washington, who valued constitutional compli-
ance, clearly believed he had the power to use such troops. Notably,
however, this belief was in line with the dominant thought of the day,
in which federal troops were associated with the executive branch,
whereas the militias were associated with the people and their repre-
sentative body, Congress.'2 That President Washington would have
more discretion with regards to federal troops than militias should be
seen as an inherent part of the executive's Commander-in-Chief
power.
Congress accepted President Washington's decision. The day af-
ter President Washington's speech, Connecticut Senator Oliver Ells-
worth gave a reply on behalf of the Senate, noting that the decision
was made "in pursuance of the powers vested in [the President]."
Meanwhile, in a speech delivered on behalf of the House of Repre-
sentatives on December 11, Pennsylvania Representative and Speaker
of the House Frederick Muhlenburg stated that the House "[beheld]
with approbation the watchfulness and vigor which have been exert-
ed by the Executive authority."'6 4 Had either house of Congress be-
lieved that the President's actions were unlawful, they likely would
have said as much, considering President Washington's desire for
constitutional conformity.'6 5 That did not occur, suggesting congres-
sional approval of the President's actions.
Congress's approval of President Washington's actions, however,
was not their last involvement with the prosecution of the Northwest
Indian War. Indeed, Congress accepted the President's claim while
continuing to meticulously legislate the conduct of the war.'" Part of
160 Id.
161 See generally An Act for Regulating the Military Establishment of the United States, Apr.
30. 1790, Ch. 10, 1 Stat. 119.
162 See ELY, supra note 32, at 4 (describing the belief that militias belonged to Congress);
DAVID C. WILLIAMS, THE MYTHIC MEANINGS OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT: TAMING
POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN A CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC 26 (2003) (noting that the militia
belonged to the state).
163 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1733 (1790) (Joseph Gale ed., 1834).
164 Id. at 1799.
165 See THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON DIGITAL EDITION, supra note 123, at 413.
166 See, e.g., An Act for Regulating the Military Establishment of the United States, Apr. 30.
1790, Ch. 10, §§ 1, 3, 5 1 Stat. 119 (illuminating the level of control that Congress exer-
cised over military matters and details).
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this meticulous legislation had to do with the fact that prior to the
Northwest Indian War, the United States did not, as mentioned earli-
er, have a standing army ready to act at the command of the Presi-
dent.67 For this reason, conducting a war necessarily required more
legislative involvement in the 1790s than it does today. Nevertheless,
there are striking similarities between the military authorizations for
the Northwest Indian War and today's War on Terror, which will be
examined in Part III.
III. LINKING THE NORTHWEST INDIAN WAR AND THE WAR ON TERROR
AND ITS CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
In Part III, I will link my analyses of the authorizations for the
Northwest Indian War and the War on Terror, and argue that
originalists should consider the Northwest Indian War as a constitu-
tional model for wars against non-state actors. In Part III.A., I argue
that neither the Northwest Indian War nor the AUMF constitute for-
mal declarations of war within the constitutional context. Formal
declarations have specific purposes within international law, and nei-
ther authorization purports to serve those purposes. In both cases, I
argue, the reason that a formal declaration was not constitutionally
required was that the United States was initiating military action
against non-state actors. In Part III.B., I address the idea that both
authorizations claim to be protective measures, and raise the ques-
tion of whether such an authorization could permit purely offensive
military action. In Part III.C., I address the considerable amount of
executive discretion Congress has allowed in determining who is and
is not an enemy. Finally, in Part III.D., I argue that both authoriza-
tions allowed for the President to initiate hostilities in military thea-
ters without returning to Congress, albeit subject to congressional
limitations.
A. AUMs, Not Formal Declarations of War
Neither the AUMF nor the Northwest Indian War Authorization is
a formal declaration of war in accordance with constitutionally-
prescribed international law. As Professor Yoo notes, in the eight-
eenth century, "a declaration of war served the purpose of notifying
167 See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1791 (1790) (Joseph Gale ed., 1834) ("Ordered, That a [House]
committee be appointed to prepare and bring in a bill or bills more effectually to provide
for the national defence [sic] by establishing a uniform militia throughout the United
States.").
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the enemy, allies, neutrals, and one's own citizens of a change in the
state of relations between one nation and another."'" Neither au-
thorization, however, notified enemies, allies, neutrals, or citizens of a
change in status because they both left open the question of against
whom force was to be used, with context only clearly linking the use
of military force to the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Against
no other party did either AUMF indicate a specific plan to initiate a
war. In fact, both documents explicitly fail to establish a state of war
in that they leave open the questions of against whom the hostilities
will occur and when they will begin. Furthermore, instead of chang-
ing formal relations within international law, both authorizations
serve the domestic purpose of notifying the President of his increased
authority to initiate a military conflict. Internationally, neither
AUMF sufficiently signals to any other party, with the exception of
the Taliban and al Qaeda, of a changed relationship.
With regards to the Authorization for the Northwest Indian War,
Congress gave President Washington the power to use military force
for protective purposes against the Indians if necessary on September
29, 1789, and allowed him to use that force for the designed purpose
whenever he should choose to do so, which he did the following De-
cember. Because it did not immediately initiate hostilities nor specify
against whom military action was to take place, the Northwest Indian
War Authorization cannot be seen as a formal declaration, as it served
no purpose with regards to the notification of the to-be Indian ene-
mies.
Furthermore, the reason the United States was able to go to war
without a formal declaration was because the rules of war did not ap-
ply in full force to the Indian tribes. While Congress did eventually
determine that the rules of war were to apply to the military conflict
with the Indians, the inclusion of that provision suggests that such
adherence was a voluntarily imposed congressional limitation upon
the President. Because the rules of war were voluntary, Congress
could constitutionally decide to initiate hostilities without a formal
declaration, while still demanding that the actual military force com-
ply with international law.
The AUMF, likewise, functioned in a similar manner. Congress
passed the AUMF on September 14, 2001, and President Bush signed
168 The Continuation of Politics, supra note 7, at 207.
169 See An Act for Regulating the Military Establishment of the United States, Apr. 30. 1790,
Ch. 10 § 16, 1 Stat. 119 (authorizing President Washington to use force if he deems it
necessary); see also Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 25, § 5, 1 Stat. 95. (including the provision to
allow President Washington to use force).
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the bill into law on September 18, 2001.0 If one agrees with Profes-
sor Yoo that a declaration is nothing more than a notification of a
changed legal status, in whatever form that notification may come,
then the AUMF could be seen as a formal declaration of war against
the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan because the impending hos-
tilities were readily foreseeable. Indeed, in his address to the nation
on the evening of September 11, 2001, President Bush announced
that there would be a "war against terrorism."7' The next day, Sena-
tor Charles Schumer of New York addressed the Senate and noted
that "all fingers seem to point" to Afghanistan as the nation from
which the terrorist attacks originated.'7 2  Furthermore, the Taliban
was already known to be harboring al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden
and was resisting cooperation with his extradition.7 " By the time the
AUMF was passed on September 18, war against the Taliban and al
Qaeda in Afghanistan seemed inevitable. For that reason, there is an
argument that the AUMF did serve as a formal declaration of war
against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan.
On the other hand, the AUMF cannot be seen as declaration of
war against the other parties later attacked under the purview of the
AUMF. While groups such as al-Shabaab, al Qaeda-Arabian Peninsu-
la, the Pakistani Taliban, and now ISIS are in violent opposition to
the United States, "many of these groups did not even exist on Sep-
tember 11, 2001, and the ones that did were not directly involved in
the attacks."'7 4 If one of the purposes of a declaration of war is to no-
tify the enemy of a change in legal status associated with the initiation
of hostilities, it is logically impossible to declare war against enemies
who do not yet exist. While one could argue that this is evidence that
the executive has exceeded his power under the AUMF, the President
can easily claim some link between these organizations and those in-
170 See Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224,
(2001) (stating that the President has the power to use force against terrorists related to
the September 11, 2001 attacks).
171 President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation following the Attacks of September 11,
2001 (Sept 11 2001) (transcript available online at
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/11/bush.speech.text/).
172 147 CONG. REC. S16868 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 2001) (statement of Sen. Schumer).
173 See Bin Laden Extradition Raised, BBC News, Sept. 12, 2001,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south-asia/1539468. stm (noting the Taliban's resistance to
the extradition of al Qaeda); 147 CONG. REC. S16868 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 2001) (statement
of Sen. McCain) (stressing that the government "should demand that Afghanistan extra-
dite to the United States Osama bin Laden").
174 Graham Cronogue, A New AUMF: Defining Combalants in the War on Terror, 22 DuKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 377, 394 (2012).
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volved with the 9/11 attacks.7" Nevertheless, because these organiza-
tions are non-state actors, as the Indian tribes were considered to be,
the rules of international law as understood by the Founding Fathers
do not apply, and for that reason a formal declaration of war is not
constitutionally necessary.
B. Preventative Measures
The AUMF and the Northwest Indian War Authorization both
claim to be preventative measures. To begin, the Northwest Indian
War Authorization allows for the President to use force to "[protect]
the inhabitants of the frontiers of the United States from the hostile
incursions of the Indians."'16 On the other hand, the AUMF author-
izes the President to use force "to prevent any future acts of interna-
tional terrorism against the United States.""' These acts show that
Congress envisioned its allowance of executive discretion as necessary
for defensive purposes.
With regards to the Northwest Indian War Authorization, offen-
sive operations were allowed under the principle that the best de-
fense was a good offense. In order to protect the frontier from Indi-
an incursions, Congress permitted the use of "punishing" operations
in retaliation.' Likewise, in his December 8, 1790 address to Con-
gress, President Washington noted that the Indians' "aggravated
provocations rendered it essential to the western settlements, that the
aggressors should be made sensible that the government of the Un-
ion is not less capable, than it is disposed to respect their rights and
reward their attachments."7 Furthermore, President Washington
noted that "[a]s this object could not be effected by defensive
measures, it became necessary to put in force the act which empowers
the President to call out the militia for the protection of the fron-
tiers.,18 0 These statements show that rather than distinguishing be-
tween defensive and offensive operations, the authorization was read
as permitting any measure, offensive or defensive, that would "pro-
tect" the frontier.
175 See Ben Hubbard, The Franchising of Al Qaeda, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 26, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/26/sunday-review/the-franchising-of-al-
qaeda.html?_r=0 (-Without Bin Laden, the terrorist group is no longer cohesive, with a
clear purpose.").
176 Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 25, § 6, 1 Stat. 95.
177 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224.
178 KOHN, supra note 2, at 101-02.
179 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1729 (1790) (Joseph Gale ed., 1834).
180 Id.
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The text of the AUMF, likewise, shows Congress's expectation for
offensive "protective" measures. While the goal of preventing future
attacks frames the text in defensive measures, the authorization to
use "all necessary and appropriate force" enables the President o use
offensive operations. If the target is appropriate, another executive
determination, and the President can make a case that offensive
measures are necessary to protect the United States, then military op-
erations are permitted. The AUMF, like the Northwest Indian War
Authorization, allows for the offensive use of force to further "defen-
sive" or "preventative" aims.
One critical potential constitutional limitation to such broad au-
thorizations is that it arguably must be framed in defensive terms.
Many scholars have noted that the President's Commander-in-Chief
power is likely at its height when the security of the nation is threat-
ened.81 Although outside the scope of this paper, it is worth ques-
tioning whether such broad executive discretion would be permitted
were the aims framed in solely offensive terms, even if the enemy was
a non-state actor.
C. Discretionary Determinations of the Enemy
Both the AUMF and the Northwest Indian War Authorization
provide expansive definitions of the enemy which allow for great ex-
ecutive discretion in determining targets. With regards to the AUMF,
the potential enemies include all "nations, organizations, or persons
[the President] determines planned, authorized, committed, or aid-
ed the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or har-
bored such organizations or persons."82 While this seems to require a
relational nexus with the attacks of September 11, 2001, the President
has broad discretion to determine who falls within that nexus.3 This
provision is extremely broad and allows the President considerable
discretion in determining against whom force is to be used. Fur-
thermore, when the definition of the enemy is seemingly limitless,
the President is given by extension broad discretion to determine the
scope of the war, as has been seen in the numerous operations that
have taken place under the parameters of the AUMF.
181 See Bahar, supra note 148, at 543 (noting that "it is fairly well-settled that in times of inva-
sions, or threat thereof, presidential authority to defend the homeland is at its height, re-
gardless of legislative sanction"); see also The Coninuation of Politics, supra note 7, at 246-48
(describing the increased powers during wartime).
182 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 2078 (quoting Authorization for the Use of Mili-
tary Force, Pub. L. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224).
183 Cronogue, supra note 174, at 379-80.
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Indeed, the precedent for the AUMF is again the Northwest Indi-
an War Authorization. While the authorization was limited to defin-
ing Indians as the potential enemies, it did not state which Indians.
This lack of specificity can be seen as problematic in that the tribes
took different positions with regards to American expansion. On
the one hand, tribes such as the Senecas were very willing to cooper-
ate with the Americans in order to gain peace and favored-nation sta-
tus, while other tribes, such as the Miamis, Shawnees, and Kickapoos,
were in favor of more militant resistance.185
Nevertheless, Congress's broad grant of authority allowed the
President to use force with regards to any Indian nation within the
Northwest Territory, and one could argue that this breadth is a
strength of the bill. Indeed, this first AUMF gave President Washing-
ton much-needed discretion in determining the scope of the military
operation as necessary. One could argue that this flexibility was vital-
ly important to the war effort, in that it allowed President Washington
to account for shifting alliances and potential treaties with Indian
tribes.
D. No Return to Congress Necessary
Simply put, both the AUMF and the Northwest Indian War Au-
thorization allow for legitimate military engagement o be initiated by
the executive branch. Despite not being a formal declaration of war,
the Northwest Indian War Authorization allowed for President Wash-
ington to initiate a war with the Indians without returning to Con-
gress. Critically, President Washington waited over six months after
the initial authorization to take military action against he Indians, 1 86
and then waited an additional six months to return to Congress to
claim that his action was permitted under the initial authorization."
Indeed, the very purpose of the authorization was seemingly to allow
for the establishment of a military force to meet the needs of the na-
tion as determined by the President, within the scope permitted by
Congress.ss
184 SWORD, supra note 58, at 61.
185 Id.
186 See KOHN, supra note 2, at 101-02 (noting that that administration hesitated to act in Jan-
uary 1790 but could not resist the impulse to act during campaigning season in late May).
187 See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1729 (1790).
188 See id. at 1791 (discussing a letter sent from President George Washington in January
1791 asking the Senate and the House of Representative to "make such arrangements as
may be essential to the preservation of good order, and the effectual protection of the
frontiers").
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While Congress allowed for considerable executive discretion,
President Washington was still bound by congressional parameters.
Indeed, during the Northwest Indian War, Congress regularly spoke
as to how it believed the war should be conducted, as they cut the pay
of troops,'" determined which forces could be used,19 and in what
formations the troops should be assembled.91 President Washington,
as Commander-in-Chief, had discretion only where that discretion
has been left in place by Congress. The actions of President Wash-
ington, however, do not suggest that the President has the power to
ignore the acts of Congress when it comes to the prosecution of the
war.
Furthermore, it seems as though this division of the war powers
remained intact throughout the War on Terror. President Bush, and
President Obama thereafter, have used the military force they have
been provided without claiming to be required to return to Congress
prior to the initiation of a new military conflict. While President
Obama is currently seeking a new authorization for military action
against ISIS,'" he has already stated that he does not believe such an
action is required," suggesting a political reason for his seeking reau-
thorization.
In addition, the Supreme Court has suggested that this division of
powers is constitutional. For example, in Rasul v. Bush, the Court re-
versed an appellate court's decision allowing the executive branch to
deny the writ of habeas corpus to those detained in Guantanamo
Bay. The Supreme Court overturned the decision because they
read the general federal habeas corpus statutes, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-
2243, as allowing the detainees to bring habeas petitions.99 While
President Bush had argued for a broader conception of his wartime
powers, the Supreme Court rejected a broader conception of the ex-
ecutive Commander-in-Chief power that would allow him to avoid
statutory limitations. The fact that the Supreme Court made its deci-
189 An Act for Regulating the Military Establishment of the United States, Apr. 30. 1790, Ch.
10, § 5, 1 Stat. 119.
190 Id. at §1.
191 Id. at § 3.
192 Jim Acosta & Jeremy Diamond, Obama ISIS Fight Request Sent to Congres, CNN, Feb. 12,
2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/1 /politics/isis-aumf-white-house-congress/.
193 Spencer Ackerman, supra note 26.
194 See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004) ("What is presently at stake is only whether the
federal courts have jurisdiction to determine the legality of the Executive's potentially in-
definite detention of individuals who claim to be wholly innocent of wrongdoing. Answer-
ing that question in the affirmative, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals ...
195 Id. at 483-84.
1341
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
sion on statutory and not constitutional grounds suggests that indeed
the President is significantly bound by congressional acts in the pros-
ecution of a war. The critical component of a military authorization
as opposed to a formal declaration, however, is that it allows for the
President to determine within the scope of the congressional author-
ization what military actions to take. Furthermore, while it is debata-
ble what constitutes a formal declaration, that discussion has no bear-
ing on wars against non-state actors, upon whom the rules of
international law do not apply.
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE NORTHWEST INDIAN WAR AS A MODEL
FOR THE WAR ON TERROR
In the preceding sections, I argued that under an originalist per-
spective, the Northwest Indian War can be seen as a constitutional
model for wars against non-state actors, most notably the current War
on Terror. At the time of the ratification of the Constitution, inter-
national law dictated that the rules of war only had to apply to sover-
eign states. The Indians, however, did not fit within the American
conception of sovereignty, and therefore Congress was able to decide
whether they wanted the United States to obey the rules of war. In
issuing the Authorization for the Northwest Indian War, the first
AUMF, Congress decided that although they wanted the army to obey
the rules of war, adherence to the rules was optional and a formal
declaration of war was not necessary. This decision that the rules of
war need not apply constitutionally allowed for much greater execu-
tive discretion in determining the scope, timing, and intended targets
of the military operation.
The United States has charted a similar course in its current War
on Terror. As former Attorney General Gonzales has noted, the Bush
Administration took the position that the United States was going to
war against non-state actors and that therefore a formal declaration
of war was not needed. This determination, coupled with the great
breadth of the AUMF, has given both the Bush and Obama Admin-
istrations considerable discretion in engaging in new military con-
flicts across the globe without returning to Congress." Since no
formal declaration of war is needed, the President is constitutionally
able to use the military as he so chooses, so long as he can make a
case that his actions are authorized by the longstanding AUMF.
196 Gonzales, supra note 48, at 843, 845-46.
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While this history does suggest that it is constitutionally permissi-
ble for the United States to go to war against non-state actors without
a formal declaration of war, there remains the normative question of
whether this distinction should still be observed. As Antony Anghie
argues, the War on Terror and its application of sovereignty-based
distinctions, has reinforced a view of international law which "created
and [enforced] distinctions between civilized and uncivilized states"
by holding "that one set of laws was applicable between civilized states
in their mutual dealings but that another set of practices was justified
in relation to uncivilized states [who by definition were not sover-
eign] ." Furthermore, Anghie claims that this ideology "distin-
guishes between.. liberal and nonliberal states, democratic and non-
democratic states, and premodern and post-modern states,"""'
justifying military action to conquer and transform the latter when
considered a threat to the former.m Neo-colonial in its nature, it is
this ideology that justified the American conquest of the "savage" In-
dian tribes, with devastating results for Indian people.00
Furthermore, this ideology is particularly potent when measures,
such as an AUMF, allow for executive power to go unchecked. As
Bruce Ackerman notes, "the president's bureaucratic-military ma-
chine is always primed for engagement,"'0  and the United States
must consider what is lost when military conflicts can be initiated
without the deliberation and consensus of the national legislature.
Professor Ackerman disapproves of this form of executive power, re-
ferred to as "government by emergency," which he argues has be-
come increasingly common in recent years.20' According to Professor
Ackerman, this process is characterized by "(1) the invocation of a
crisis (2) to justify deeply problematic... executive action that (3) has
enduring legal consequences, lasting long beyond the initial 'cri-
sis.'"1" In doing so, "government by emergency" has allowed for the
President to claim even more power as Commander-in-Chief.204 This
197 Antony Anghie, Rethinking Sovereignty in International Law, 5 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. SCi. 291,
293 (2009).
198 Id. at 307.
199 Id.
200 See Natsu Taylor Saito, Colonial Presumptions: The War on 7rror and the Roots of American
Exceptionalism, 1 GEO.J. LAw & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 67, 109-10 (2008) ("U.S. offi-
cials now argue that established rules of warfare do not apply in the war on terror because
the enemy does not behave rationally.").
201 BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 73 (2010).
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 See Anghie, supra note 197, at 305 (noting that, according to the Bush Administration, "in
times of emergency, power is transferred to the president and .. . other institutions of
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is particularly problematic with regards to military responses to ter-
rorism, in which the incessant threat "could give rise to a permanent
state of emergency."o2  Indeed, one could easily argue that it already
has.
"Government by emergency," permissible due to the perceived
lack of sovereignty of both tribes and terrorists, allows for expansive
and oftentimes troubling assertions of executive power. Therefore,
as Professors Matthew L.M. Fletcher and Peter S. Vicaire note, the
precedent of the Indian wars continues to be used in troubling ways
to justify executive actions in the War on Terror."' For example, they
note the Bush Administration's claim that the Modoc Indian Wars of
1871-1873 supported the proposition that prisoners from the War on
Terror could be tried by military commissions.0  During the Modoc
Wars, they argued, members of non-state entities could be tried by
military commissions so long as their actions were directed against
the United States generally, and therefore those accused of terrorism
208should be treated in a similar manner.
The use of this precedent is troubling in that seeks to render
permissible a strain of thought that was used to perpetuate significant
injustices. While the Modocs did kill American officers during a
peace parley, the Americans had also killed forty-one Modocs in a
similar fashion, actions for which there was no reprimand and which
helped spark the current conflict. Furthermore, the commission
was a sham, as General Jefferson Davis, who oversaw the proceeding,
made sure to appoint "military men with deep emotional hatred to-
ward the Modoc defendants" to serve on the commission and "has-
tened the opening of the trial to prevent an attorney hoping to rep-
resent the Modocs from arriving on time."210 Simply put, the
"conviction and execution of the Modocs was inevitable.""' Yet de-
spite this troubling history, American executives have continued to
government such as the courts cannot and should not interfere with the decisions made
by the president to ensure the very survival of the state").
205 Id. at 306.
206 See Fletcher & Vicaire, supra note 9, at 223-27 ("The Fort Snelling mass executions and
incarcerations of the Dakota people parallel modern American prisons at Guantinamo
Bay and elsewhere.").
207 Id. at 225-26 (citing Legality of the Use of Military Commissions To Try Terrorists, 25 Op.
O.L.C. 8 (2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2001/pub-millcommfinal.pdf.).
208 Id.
209 Id. at 226.
210 Id. at 227.
211 Id.
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rely on this precedent, and others like it, to justify controversial mili-
tary practices.
In Indian country, the effects of these precedents have already
been seen. The American conquest of the Indians took place
through a series of military conflicts and treaties, backstopped by the
doctrines of discovery and rights of conquest.2 12 The doctrine of dis-
covery endowed European colonial powers and by extension the
United States the exclusive right to settle "vacant" lands occupied by
American Indians."' Conquest, meanwhile, allowed for the acquisi-
tion of land only when the cause was just; demarcations of Indians as
savage and treacherous thereby "provided the basis for English claims
of a legal right to wage wars of conquest based on the nature and
character of the enemy. These doctrines, only applicable due to
the perceived lack of tribal sovereignty and inapplicability of interna-
tional law, had disastrous results for Indian tribes, leading to debates
over whether what occurred was genocide or "instances of geno-
cide."m The results were that grim. Differential treatment of ene-
mies based on American conceptions of sovereignty may be constitu-
tionally permissible, but to enact this dichotomy is to revive a
doctrine that has had catastrophic consequences. To revive this dis-
tinction to allow for expansive executive action in the War on Terror
is particularly noteworthy in that it recalls the ways by which interna-
tional law was subverted to allow for grave atrocities and injustices to
be committed against the Indian tribes. Proponents of originalism
must therefore grapple with the moral implications of continuing to
use such distinctions, even if it is constitutionally permissible.
CONCLUSION
Too often the context of the specific war itself has been left out of
debates over the proper scope of the war powers, debates which have
been revived during the current War on Terror. To examine the
constitutionality of this war, I have undertaken an originalist exami-
nation of the Northwest Indian War, paying particular attention to
the rules of international law at the time and the way those rules may
have infused the Constitution. To conclude, my analysis of the
Northwest Indian War and its authorization suggest that it may be a
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constitutional model for understanding the War on Terror and other
wars against non-state actors. However, I question whether such dif-
ferentiation between state and non-state actors should be used in the
modem era, noting the troubling underpinnings and results of this
theory. I challenge proponents of originalism to address this issue.
